This article analyses the use of IT tools in the management of Intellectual Property in collaborative projects involving groups of firms and their customer organisations in the design, development, manufacture and maintenance of complex products. Through an in-depth study of IP management practice in collaborative defence projects we identify two contrasting approaches to the implementation of inter-organisational networks for the exchange of technical information. We find that, in both approaches, the IP management capacities offered by IT tools have not been fully utilised. The slow diffusion of available technological solutions can be attributed to organisational and regulatory factors.
Intellectual Property in collaborative projects: navigating the maze Introduction
Until recently, the management of Intellectual Property (IP) and its associated Rights (IPR -formally protected IP) was treated as a specialised function within a company.
Corporate strategy would concern itself mainly with the management of tangible and financial assets, and IP management would be left to specialist lawyers who dealt with patents and other forms of formal IP protection as needed. This situation is changing.
Toward the late 1990s, analysts were underlining the importance of IP and IPR management as a key element of corporate policy Teece 1998; Ruggles and Holtshouse 1999; Shapiro and Varian 1999; Reitzig 2004; Chesbrough 2003; Rivette and Kline 2000; Davis 2004 ), and as a strategic intangible asset influencing corporate performance (Buigues, Jacquemin, and Marchipont 2000; Nonaka and H Takeuchi 1995; Quinn 1992; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Chesbrough 2003; Rivette and Kline 2000) . Important as IP is for the modern corporation, scholars have found it a difficult concept to define accurately.
1 Dictionaries define IP as a product of the intellect that has commercial value and is intangible 2 . Yet, IP can be expressed in many different tangible forms: books, blueprints, designs, trademarks are all expressions of IP, which can be made available to other parties. The increasing use of Information Technology 1 For a clear discussion of the IP concept and the different forms of IP see for instance (Weil and Snapper 1989) . 2 The American Heritage Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary, respectively. So far, corporate responses and academic analyses have focused on IP management within the firm (Reitzig 2004; Grindley and Teece 1997; Tang 1998; Chesbrough 2003) . Similarly, analysts who have studied the role of digital technologies in collaboration, also address knowledge management within the firm (McAfee 2006) .
However, the problems and challenges faced are likely to be different when managing IP in the context of inter-firm collaborative projects in which groups of firms, often competitors, and sometimes their customer organisations share in the design, development, manufacture and operation of complex products. In these cases large amounts of technical data (including designs, product specifications, manufacturing processes, etc.) can be shared through the use of innovative advanced IT tools, with the aim of increasing efficiency and reducing time for the delivery of the asset/system.
The resulting "Shared Digital Environments" (SDEs) involve data networks and data management systems used by project partners to manage and share technical data across organisations. SDEs are being proposed by leading customers, such as the UK Ministry of Defence, as a tool to assist in the design, engineering and manufacturing of large complex products in a wide variety of sectors. The management of IP in SDEs, as discussed below, poses problems that are different in nature and scope to those of IP management within the firm.
This article analyses the nature of the problems posed by IP management in SDEs and discusses how organisations have, in practice, tried to devise solutions. Our main concern is the management of information and data whose disclosure or unauthorised use can generate a loss of commercial advantage to its owner. Although, strictly
speaking not all IP falls within this category, 3 we retain the use of the term IP for convenience, as it is commonly used to refer to departments, groups and experts The article is structured as follows. We first discuss our approach. We then introduce the main relevant traits of present UK defence procurement practice, in particular the way it deals with IP, and analyse the specific IP management problems encountered when conducting collaborative ventures in the defence industries. We follow with a discussion of the strategies for responding to these challenges, and an analysis of the ways in which two specific SDEs have been implemented. We find that they have adopted different implementation models. We conclude with generic lessons for IP management in collaborative ventures.
Our approach
Our analysis has followed a case study methodology addressing the IP corporate management practices in the main British defence-related corporations and the way they relate to the IP practices of their main customer: the UK MoD. This choice of sector, however, does not limit the relevance of our study as the management of IP when using electronic networks has generic implications and applications for nondefence sectors. Although there are distinctive aspects to the regulatory environment of the defence sector, there is nothing inherently typical in the contractual procedures and guidelines for IP management that the sector has developed. For instance, the guidelines on how to develop a contractual structure for a "shared data environment" discussed below are equally applicable to any other industry. Still, some argue that the IP environment in which defence customer agencies and their industrial suppliers operate is characterised by a cosy relationship derived from a long-term customer-
supplier relationship in what is a comparatively closed and trusted environment. If this was ever the case it is no longer now. New suppliers are entering the defence market, the defence industrial structure is in the midst of potentially profound changes (Gholz 2003) , and changes in procurement practices have heightened the tension between large defence suppliers and their customers. 4 The UK defence sector is therefore becoming more open and akin to other commercial environments where trust between suppliers and clients can be lacking, fragile or in need of nurturing.
As noted above, the UK defence sector has invested a special effort to develop precise codes of practice and procedures affecting all aspects of the contractual process and project management including IPR procedures (see below). Further, the "Smart Acquisition" initiative launched by the MoD emphasises the use of e-commerce and advanced IT applications to improve project performance. The MoD's establishment of a Defence Information Infrastructure, which is part of the Defence Change Programme, also aims to replace a large assortment of individual information systems throughout the MoD with a single more efficient information infrastructure. These measures are part of MoD's modernising effort, which will result in the complex integration of technical data and business processes throughout a system's life-cycle.
A catalogue of detailed IPR regulations has been thus set against an effort to develop and implement sophisticated IT systems in support of product development, manufacture and maintenance. 4 We have explored elsewhere the mistrust between defence suppliers and the MoD generated by the way in which IPR have been handled in the privatisation process of the British defence research establishments (******)
We first undertook a documentary study of the IP practices and regulations used in defence contracting laid out in the "contractual conditions" used by the MoD procurement agency (the Defence Procurement Agency -DPA). We followed with a programme of semi-structured interviews using two different interview protocols, one addressing corporate policies and activities, and another oriented to the analysis of IP management practices within specific projects. The main objective of the interview programme was to determine the ways in which firms addressed IP management in a digital environment both within the corporation and in collaborative programs.
To guide the interviews we designed a protocol structured according to a list of IP management topics with potential effects on firm and corporate performance. We based the list on IP management issues identified by the extant literature on IP management within specific sectors and firms (Granstrand 2004; Guilhon, Attia, and Rizoulieres 2004; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Tang and Paré 2003; Shapiro 2001; Tang 1998; Grindley and Teece 1997; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2000) . also a situation in which it is difficult to control and monitor the information flows, and the kind of information through the variety of inter-organisational systems.
That every project sets up its own IT system and IP rules and practices is also explained by the "alarming" lack of detailed corporate IP policies, a finding also reported by a study commissioned by DLA, a London-based law firm (Tait 2004; Nunan 2004 Instead, we have observed that the IP management "ethos" is biased, in the main, toward the formal protection processes -deciding whether or not to patent. The ofteninformal practices that determine, for instance, when and how to share proprietary information with clients and partners are not instituted as part of a corporate IP policy. 8 The rest of this section discusses some of the problems that the defence companies and their customers have encountered when addressing IP issues in this context.
IP issues in collaborative environments
The protection of information within SDEs
The first key problem with an SDE is the protection of "background information."
Background information refers to the wide range of pre-existing proprietary information that a company brings to a collaborative project, from technical data and components and subsystems, to manufacturing processes and design techniques.
These will need to be integrated with technology brought by other firms or developed for this project, and therefore other firms may need to have access to such "background information." By sharing background information through SDEs companies run the risk of (inadvertent) leakage of commercially sensitive information; such as technical data about specific components, designs, design techniques or other processes that are not usually patented, but rather kept secret.
The second potential problem relates to the early release of "foreground information,"
information developed during the course of the project. Although the MoD will have rights of use over such foreground information where it has funded its development, contractors worry about the possibility that, through an SDE, the customer may access data that is still being worked upon. This is because work-in-progress foreground information, often privately ventured, may include commercially sensitive information on company techniques and processes that will not be included in the final data packs delivered to the customer. Furthermore, firms are concerned about liability issues that may be derived from the customer accessing and using data that are still in draft form and not ready, or not intended, for delivery to the customer. All companies were concerned about this problem, albeit in different degrees, depending on the extent to which they saw their competitive advantage as depending upon codified technologies that could be transferred to potential competitors, or on being "first to market." They all agreed, however, that there is a need to "educate" their engineering staff about the importance of protecting their IP appropriately, particularly as inter-organisational collaboration is increasingly being supported by advanced IT.
Convergence of product and process data
An effect of the use of IT in systems design is the confluence of product and process data within the same data sets. This is the case, for instance, in the manufacture of specialised components for aero-engines or for aero-structures, which is driven by unique software-based processes. Naturally companies do not wish to reveal these processes to third parties, but sharing product data in electronic format could imply sharing also software-based processes when product and processes data are inextricably linked. Companies that base their competitive advantage on the uniqueness of their manufacturing processes fear that an SDE could make them vulnerable to disclosure of their trade secrets. Equally, coping with different approaches to IP management across countries is problematic. Firms may not be able to trust the practices of their foreign partners and may decide to withhold information. We were offered examples of firms involved in international collaborative research programmes that were not contributing their best IP to the project, thus resulting in the joint research project performing at a suboptimal level. 9 A related problem is the lack of consistency in the meaning of the terms used by firms and governments to class the different levels of information protection and access. For instance, terms like "restricted" are interpreted differently among firms. Although we found no cases in which these differences led to identifiable financial losses or leakage of vital IP, our interviewees were adamant about the need for consistency and common use of terms, particularly when structuring an SDE for collaborative projects.
Addressing the issues: what solutions?
The issues and difficulties presented above may not pose an insurmountable barrier to the introduction of SDEs in collaborative defence projects. In fact, defence customers and their industrial suppliers have been seeking solutions to address the aforementioned problems through four different but interrelated areas:
1. the definition of codified procedures to assure proper identification of all individuals accessing the system, together with their rights of use across all stakeholders;
2. the establishment of procedures and rules regarding the management of the SDE, and the marking and segregation of the data the SDE contains;
3. the network technologies and inter-organisational systems they support;
4. the underlying training necessary to raise awareness of the importance of IP management among stakeholders and to explain the nature and implications of the tools and procedures in place.
The first two aspects, can, in principle, be addressed through contractual conditions and associated commitments.
Contractual conditions
Buyers may try to address the uncertainty on the use and sharing of IP and IPRs through the inclusion of detailed contractual provisions. In the UK defence sector, a wide choice of DEFCONs ("Defence Conditions") and DEFFORMS (templates for annexes that can be appended to contracts ) are available for contract officers to include in contracts (Ministry of Defence 2004). These provide detailed contractual clauses and provisions applicable to a wide set of situations.
Although it is not mandatory for IPTs to include specific DEFCONs within a contract, or to follow rigidly to a specific DEFCON, explicit guidance documents recommend the adoption of some DEFCONs in specific contractual conditions. For instance, DEFCON 14 is commonly included in contracts for work that is likely to generate new IP. This and other generally used DEFCONs provide, in practice, an established contractual framework that defines the MoD negotiation policy for key aspects of defence procurement, including IPR. Yet it is ultimately the responsibility of the specific contracting team to decide which DEFCONs to include and whether or not to modify them.
While some DEFCONs are relatively straightforward and often applied, there are others that have given rise to serious contention between the MoD and defence suppliers. In part, the differences emerge from the difficulties of covering all possible future events through generic contractual provisions. For instance, the long life cycle of many defence systems which extend over three or more decades during which they will be subjected to several planned and unplanned upgrades and changes to improve the capabilities of the system. Managing these complex systems over such long life spans engender difficult IP problems. We distinguish two main sets of difficulties.
First, although several units of systems operate side-by-side (for instance, a squadron of a same model of fighter aircraft), it is common that the individual aircraft will have a slightly different configuration although together they may be formally belong to the same model. In practice, different sub-classes of each model may be identified ex-post by "working backwards" through the different modifications to which the planes have been subjected. In this situation, it is difficult to identify and monitor the ownership of the IP that may be involved in each small change and the superseded components that were part of the initial system. A line-by-line definition of the different IPR contained within a complex system may not be possible, and therefore it may remain preferable to stipulate IPR conditions in generic terms.
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Second, ownership over product data can generate problems with long term system maintenance and repair needs. Contractual conditions try to address this situation. For instance, the application of DEFCON 15 will require from a contractor the supply of a "manufacturing data pack" to which the MoD will have rights of use for the purpose of competitive procurement. DEFCON 15 is only to be applied when the development of a system has been fully funded by the MoD. Yet, today's highly complex defence systems are likely to include subsystems or parts, or involve processes, whose development has been privately funded, a point already discussed above. The leading prime contractors we interviewed pointed out that it is very likely that some of the IP that the client requests to be included as part of the manufacturing data pack will involve technologies from private investment. They are therefore anxious not "to give away" data that could be and is likely to be commercially sensitive, particularly if the 10 However, there is a debate in the field of relational contractual theory as to the extent to which contracts can and should be written to address all possible eventualities in a complex, long-term project. Contract theorists have argued that contract is not an abstract formalistic mechanism, but one that typically involves development of relationships that go beyond the terms of a contract and evolve through the course of the project (MacNeil 1999 (MacNeil , 1980 . The practice in defense contracting, however, has tended towards the detailed specification of conditions and deliverables trying to cover for all possible eventualities.
support and maintenance of the system is not to be eventually undertaken by the prime contractor, but by a third party.
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Furthermore, there is a cost to the provision of a data manufacturing pack that DEFCON 15 does not appear to contemplate. As product components and subsystems are constantly updated, refreshing a manufacturing data pack over the life cycle of the system needs to take into account all changes made by the prime contractor and its supply chain. This cost, coupled with the IP problem addressed above, does not appear to be thoroughly recognised by the MoD, according to the interviewed companies.
The preceding examples show some emerging tensions in the application of IP conditions by the MoD. The root of the problem here is that it is very difficult to foresee and track all the contributions, changes and new requirements that will take place during an asset's long life. Nonetheless, there was a consensus among our interviewees, shared by the DPA officials that it is necessary to codify procedures for the protection of IP when dealing with the procurement of complex, long-life cycle systems. In fact some DEFCONS, such as DEFCON 15 referred to above, have been developed in collaboration with industry.
Directly relevant to our article is the "687 family" of DEFCONs and DEFFORMs, which establish how a "shared data environment" should be operated. The continual development of a contractual system to deal with IP management issues is in a state of dynamic tension and one characterised by a mixture of collaboration and conflict. Still, there is broad agreement on the need to continue with the collaborative approach that has led to the development of some crucial IPR DEFCONs.
Supporting network technologies and inter-organisational systems
The second response to the IP problems lies in the use of IT systems. data set that would accompany a complex system through its life-cycle, from conceptual design to system decommissioning, and would be delivered to the customer together with the system. In an SDE this data set would be available to partners during the system's design and production.
Initial applications of these principles proved problematic. 12 During the 1990s, the civilian Boeing 777 became the best-publicised case of collaborative design and production across different locations for an aircraft system. This example was heralded as an innovative programme for its team management approaches and was also lauded for representing the first use of digital computers to design and electronically pre-assemble an entire plane. 13 Further, joint design was achieved 12 For an early discussion of their application to the European fighter aircraft project, Eurofighter, see (Spinardi, Graham, and Williams 1995) . 13 Yet a very sophisticated IT system for technical data sharing a across US partners, project design and engineering has been described and analysed for the B-2 Stealth Bomber, an aircraft design and manufacturing project that predated the 777 by several years (Argyres 1999) .
through a distributed computer network, consisting of mainframes and workstation installations in Japan, Kansas, Philadelphia, and other locations.
Yet for all its achievements this IT system fell short of constituting a full-blown SDE in the way defined above. Instead of offering a centralised online product database available to project partners, the communication between suppliers and Boeing was often carried out using more rudimentary techniques, which in the opinion of an interviewee was because 777 is "old technology" and thus the prime contractor did not see the need to introduce a more sophisticated IT system for data transmission.
According to our interviewees, suppliers would e-mail their designs to the prime contractors' sites and vice-versa, a process that was often slow and cumbersome given the size of the file attachments and the low speed of the modem links used. The slowness also caused delayed "design deadlines," for instance, because the IT network could not always cope with the volumes of data being transmitted. This meant that file attachments were left sitting "on hold" until the system could clear the backlog of data transmission.
The diffusion of SDEs using centralised databases accessible to project partners is still very limited. The US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the British "Type 45"
Destroyer, described in more detail below, are the main examples of involvement by UK defence firms in programmes using an SDE.
Briefly, in Type 45 the prime contractor (who is not the leading manufacturer but is the systems integrator) is responsible for setting up a centralised product database system to which all project collaborators can have access, and to organise and control different levels of access to each of the "folders" in the system. The system is based on Internet architecture, can be accessed through a Wide Area Network or dial-up connections, and uses a suite of off-the-shelf software applications. In some cases the applications have had to be modified in-house to adapt them to the specific needs of the programme; this is the case, for instance, with Windchill, a set of software tools to enable a shared, Web-based configuration and document management system.
The prime contractor for JSF is "Lockheed Martin Aeronautics" (LMA), which is both the final assembler and systems integrator, and also a sub-systems and parts manufacturer for the aircraft. LMA has implemented an SDE, which again rests on Internet standards and a combination of off-the-shelf software tools, including "Metaphase" (a Product Data Management programme enabling access to an extended supply network) and, again, Windchill (providing a Web access to programme management data). LMA controls access to these facilities.
These examples show how Internet standards have been central to the implementation of SDEs in the defence sector. However, the need to tailor these off-the-shelf software technologies for each project represents a difficult challenge for which no ready-made solution exists and that can be addressed using the different implementation models described below.
Training
The third solution to the IP management problems is the need to inculcate in the engineering personnel a staunch sense of the importance of corporate IP. While training is frequently undertaken by corporations in various areas, IP management training does not appear to be widely adopted or considered as a core part of training.
As noted above, all the firms interviewed expressed concern about the allegedly SDE models that we uncovered in our study.
Two implementation models
As reviewed above, we found few defence programmes with British participation in which an SDE system has been established. Here we show the two main cases of dissimilar implementation models. They are different in the way the two major constituents of an SDE solution are defined and combined. We distinguish them accordingly:
1. A "regulated approach" as applied in UK contracts using elements of the 687 series of DEFCONs and DEFFORMs.
2. A "prime-led" approach as applied in the US-led JSF transatlantic collaborative programme. Here the prime contractor controls the definition of the interorganisational system and imposes it, together with its associated IP conditions, to its international supply chain.
Regulated approach: Type 45 and contractual conditions
The Type 45 Anti-Warfare Destroyer is a large 7350-ton ship designed to provide fleet defence. Six platforms have already been contracted out of a total planned requirement of eight. This is the first fully-fledged development and production programme to implement an SDE following the approach laid out by the "687 family"
of DEFCONs and DEFFORMs. Type 45 draws upon DEFFORM 687a, which places obligations on the prime contractor to create and manage a database of project response to the controversial book by Nicholas Carr (Carr 2004) in which the author argues that IT' strategic importance has dissipated because of the wide availability of similar IT tools.
information and make it accessible to users, and DEFFORM 687b, which establishes a "database information agreement" that sets out mutual obligations for all parties accessing it. These forms include IP clauses establishing, inter alia, that uploading data into the database does not imply the granting and unauthorised use of any IPR, and an obligation on the contractor to grant a user license to the customer (MoD) to operate and maintain the database system once this is transferred from the contractor.
Although the responsibility for creating and managing the SDE can be vested in a third party, in this case it is the prime contractor, BAE SYSTEMS Electronics Limited, 15 who is in charge of setting up the SDE. This is one of the responsibilities of the "Prime Contract Office" (PCO), but it has involved other partners and stakeholders in the development of the system, such as:
• through the application of DEFFORMs that are themselves the result of a process of negotiation among the industry stakeholders and the MoD.
• the PCO drawing on the input from main stakeholders, which includes five main supplier firms and the programme client, the Defense Procurement Agency. All have access to the SDE through a dedicated Wide Area Network. Defining the SDE, its applications and management, and the user practices were collectively conducted through an "Enterprise Integration User Group," comprising representatives of all the main stakeholders. This Group is responsible for overseeing the system implementation across stakeholders, and reviewing and updating the enterprise integration strategy. The resulting "Enterprise Integration Implementation Plan" affirms that IPR previously owned by a stakeholder will not "normally" be published in the SDE, and that, if it is, such "background IPR" will be protected by access controls and made accessible only to the relevant stakeholders.
The Type 45 SDE is however limited in the extent of the applications and data exchanges it supports. The system carries extensive information on project management tasks, and provides a tool for sharing project information across all
stakeholders. Yet the use of the system is limited to information that does not have a classification of "Confidential" or higher national security restriction, a common classification in defence projects (and in civil projects). Technical data published in the SDE includes mainly graphical representations of the "product geometry" and a "product model" that can be used to guide the evolving design within the collaborating firms. Detailed design data, however, as for instance the CAD files used for the design of the different elements are not shared through the SDE.
Despite these limitations the Type 45 SDE presents a new stage in the extent to which collaborative IT-based tools have been implemented to facilitate the collaborative development, production and operation of a complex product, and the management of stakeholders' IP. The system has now been in place for almost five years, has become a key tool in the management of the programme.
Yet, notably the complexity inherent in setting SDEs is magnified when it involves international partners. For instance, participants in the Type 45 SDE pointed out that one of the reasons why the system operates with relative simplicity is that it is a domestic project and that no foreign suppliers may access the system, as international programmes, as noted above, need to deal with complex export control legislation and to accommodate different national regulations on issues like IPR and privacy. Given that Type 45's SDE is relatively "smaller" size and national in character, it is questionable whether this type of SDE would be "scalable" for larger international projects. On the other hand, the JSF case discussed below provides an example of the challenges faced when international collaboration is organised around an SDE.
Prime-led approach: the case of JSF As discussed above, LMA, prime contractor for the JSF system has set up an SDE using a number of available digital networking technologies. This is a mandated system, imposed as a condition for collaboration and in which the prime contractor, who manages and controls the SDE, defines and establishes its architecture and procedures. The JSF is the biggest weapon program in history ($276 billion).
The SDE revolves around a Joint Data Library (JDL) that serves as the node for technical data sharing across project participants. Ownership of data in the JDL is indicated by restrictive legends, which are included in the footer of all data and drawings. Access to the JDL is established through formal agreements, so-called Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs) between LMA and its suppliers. TAAs specify the kind of data that can be accessed and used by the supplier and are complex to operate, particularly when they involve non-US suppliers. Often, several TAAs are signed with each supplier covering different sets of data for which the supplier acquires rights to upload and download. TAAs have to take into account existing US export control regulations and establish the relevant data access control accordingly when signing TAAs with foreign suppliers. On the one hand this has a positive effect:
it deals with the nettlesome problem of export controls regulations. On the other hand, the system has become cumbersome to operate. For instance, a British firm participating in the programme has signed over 160 TAAs covering, among other things, different requirements relating to the export and re-export of the technical data in different components and sub-systems.
Furthermore, any data communication between two suppliers has to be approved by LMA, regardless of the TAAs signed between the two suppliers and the prime.
Accordingly the JDL is partitioned: suppliers cannot access the project data of other suppliers, only LMA has access to all data and information in the JDL. Moreover, when a supplier is involved in different subsystems it will need to access different and separate folders under different TAAs. This means that different parts of a corporation working on other sections or aircraft sub-systems will not have access to each other's data sets within the JDL. Again this has positive and negative effects: each supplier has its own set of folders containing its own information, which acts as a means of IP protection, avoiding potential confusion as to what information belongs to whom. Yet, the system slows down collaboration across suppliers. If a company needs data from another supplier, it will have to request it from LMA, who will then "post" the information in a common folder available to both companies, after checking that the requested information is available and indicated on the TAAs signed by both companies. Even such controls have not prevented the JSF project from being beset by disputes between the UK and the US over the sharing of sensitive technology.
Finally, the management of the access control at individual level is even more awkward. Any supplier employee wishing to access JDL data will have to request permission from the prime contractor, who then manually checks whether the individual is covered by a TAA and what are the rights that this TAA establishes.
Once this information is ascertained the prime contractor provides access to the relevant project folder or folders. Yet the onus is on the individual to ensure that the information or access rights it needs are listed on the relevant TAA. Participating companies have had to train the employees working on this system on the complex operating procedures by which it is regulated.
In an international SDE, the issue of export controls is commingled with that of IP for the simple reason that export-controlled items also contain an array of IP and IPR. In comparison, an SDE with domestic collaborators is less complicated, although as has been noted in the Type 45 case, an assortment of IT-based controls and procedures to manage the participants' IP has been instituted.
Managing IP in collaborative SDEs: some concluding thoughts
Despite the burgeoning literature on the technical development and implementation of IT applications to support business activities, there is a noticeable paucity of studies on how firms actually use IT to manage their IP and IPR. This article has analysed the IP issues that arise in inter-organisational collaborative projects using SDEs, extending as well the current literature on corporate management of IP, which has so far focused mainly on IP management within the firm.
Our study focused on two defence projects involving development and production of large weapon systems and identified two contrasting examples of the ways in which SDEs can be implemented in collaborative projects and IP managed within them. We have explored how these two models of SDE deal with the issues of IP protection, security, confidentiality, privacy, authenticity and integrity of data, and identity management for access control. We have also illustrated their shortcomings and have argued that the full potential of existing IT-based tools has not been under utilised for a catalogue of reasons, not least of which is a lack of effective corporate IP policy. So how can the scope of an SDE be extended so that the potential offered by IT to organise and co-ordinate complex design and engineering tasks across organisations is fully exploited, while minimising the risks of IP misappropriation and leakage? The problems that our study has unveiled suggest actions that can expand the scope and functionality of future SDEs.
The technical solution
As we have seen, an approach to prevent unauthorised data access is the data segmentation approach used in the JSF SDE. This approach diminishes the chances of data leakage but it can slow down collaboration among suppliers, is operationally cumbersome and could cause data replication across folders. Furthermore, data replication carries with it the risk of data fracture; that is, unless configured appropriately, the data in one folder could be updated without the same data being changed in another folder, thereby ending in two versions of the same document.
The alternative is to administer the system by tagging each data element with information including its origin, security, commercial confidentiality markings, and access restrictions, and then linking the access rights of individuals to the markings.
This requires a parallel identity and access management system, in which all individuals must have proof of identity to log on to the system. Access will depend on the individual's organisation, role within the organisation and other factors, like nationality, which will bear on the definition of his or hers access privileges.
Such "data level" management system would allocate access rights automatically, thus eliminating the need for a manual management of access privileges. The The TCSP system essentially departs from a centralized data library of the SDEs and moves toward a "federated trust structure" in which technical data is held by each collaborating partner. Access to such data by any partner is underpinned by a robst identity management system in which all project participants have a unique identity.
The identity will be established through commonly agreed methods (between project collaborators and the customer) for proofing and vetting, before a credential is issued.
This concept is now being tested by TCSP.
The managerial solution
The main challenge for the establishment of an SDE or a federated trust system is of a managerial nature. Specifically, an SDE able to deal adequately with IP issues has to rest on five key foundations:
(1) a commitment by participant companies to a corporate IP policy laying out guidelines and codes of practice on the treatment of corporate IP, including training of research personnel;
(2) a recognition that a corporate IP management policy entails integration of input from the IT, legal and commercial departments into its definition;
(3) a commitment to allocate the necessary resources for managing the SDE system throughout the collaborative partnership;
(4) an agreement on the ICT tools to monitor and track the information shared through the SDE;
(5) the establishment of procedures to ensure continual robustness, security and functionality of the SDE system to ensure that all IP is "appropriately respected."
Most of these foundations relate to non-technical issues. Our study revealed that commercial and IP managers were particularly concerned about those aspects of IP management that are more difficult to control through contractual or technical measures. Under these circumstances the lack of guidelines on the treatment of information assets can emerge as a barrier to the establishment of an SDE. Corporatewide IP management policies and procedures can be seen as a precondition to the establishment of project-specific SDEs.
Furthermore, although technical approaches to deal with this problem exist, such as those described above,, there is a need for a corporate IP management policy to address training and raise awareness of the importance of blithe sharing of data.
Equally importantly, a corporate policy has to consider instituting company wide processes and procedures for the treatment of company IP that is not formally protected and not focus mainly on formal protection mechanisms.
Moreover, as different SDEs are created for different projects, there is a possibility that in the future, the same company will be involved in several SDEs using different systems, contractual conditions and IP sharing rules. Such complexity also calls for better training of research personnel in the treatment and management of IP, lest it results in incoherent IP management practices, in much the same way that employee training in and buy-in of corporate IT investments is necessary to generate premium returns from such investments (Weill and Aral 2006) . Therefore, training on IP management in digital collaborative environments needs to rise above its current project-by-project approach to an all encompassing corporate IP management policy with well articulated procedures and behavioural guidelines for the treatment of IP and information.
Our research revealed that an effective corporate IP management policy ideally should sit at the interface of IT strategy, commercial and contractual policies, and engineering and design practices. While it is necessary for commercial and legal personnel to "steer" the policy, it is the engineers and technical personnel who will, eventually, be responsible for their implementation. We found a tenuous interaction between these two groups of people. For instance, the Type 45 Enterprise Integration
Plan establishes mechanisms to request the opinions of SDE users on the operation of the system. This is an example of a good management principle: such a policy provides an information channel between engineers using the SDE and those in charge of its management. Yet, despite following "good practice" Type 45 SDE falls short of bringing together engineering, IT personnel, commercial and legal communities in the definition of an IP management policy approach. It must be noted that in ensuring that IP is properly protected and used, and data access effectively controlled in an SDE, contractual obligations, IP practices and IT architecture are inevitably inextricably linked. This requires close collaboration between the commercial/legal and IT departments, and therefore needs to be led from the corporate executive level. Lapses in this collaboration would likely lead to an inadequate IP management policy.
In more general terms the establishment of inter-organisational networks needs to account for the legal and regulatory environment within which SDEs operate. As noted above, experts that had participated in the development and, now, operation of the Type 45 SDE believed that its implementation had been made easier because of the national character of the programme. An international project would be much more difficult to manage and would probably result in more modest functionality or require a larger suite of software-based applications and procedures, and more complex configuration, which have been discussed. In particular, the requirements imposed by export control regulations will affect the architecture of an international SDE. It is important to note that these constraints are not unique to defence projects; many high technology programmes will deal with controlled technologies and will be subject to the same constraints regardless of their military or civilian character. The influence of regulatory constraints on the nature and structure of SDEs is crucial although it is often overlooked in the literature on inter-organisational networks.
In sum, we draw from our study two central themes. First, in this knowledge economy in which globalization of multiple business operations including R&D is a growing trend which greatly emphasises collaboration, the management of IP has moved deeper into the centre stage. As companies extend their enterprise outwards to third party access, such as suppliers, the line between the internal and external network becomes fuzzy, and securing the network and the information it is designed to hold and transmit from a plethora of users becomes correspondingly more difficult.
Second, advances in IT and networking technologies allow the materialization of interactive and flexible management practices, design and production, and distribution processes. Such technologies offer the opportunity to share costs and risks, but as we have seen, there is a real potential of knowledge-loss. Hence the way that executives manage and respond to IT's transforming role will much determine the benefits that they may reap from IT and IT-enabled collaboration (Carr 2004 
